INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AND STABILIZATION CASES: LIBERIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND RWANDA

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ABSTRACT

Civil war(s) and ethnic rivalries are root causes of political instability in the world today. Fighting starts because of political claims, greed or grievances and protagonists fight one against another using traditional and /or conventional weapons. When fighting lasts for days, months or years and tolls are being reported every day by local, regional and international media, alarming emergency situations and when protagonists are most likely tired of fighting because no one side tends to win the battle; international community is set to put pressure on protagonists to accept mediation. This is when and how international organizations and/or regional blocks start the role of meditation seeking a cease fire. This study highlights three cases for which United Nations international peacekeepers have operated, that's to say 'Mozambique, Liberia and Rwanda'. The researcher wants to show the cases in which United Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded, half-succeeded and completely failed.

Keywords: Civil Wars, International Peacekeeping, International Community, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and United Nations

1. INTRODUCTION

Ethnic Civil war or fighting between different groups for any reason(s) is one of the root causes of political unrest and instability of a country. Fighting starts because of political claims, greed or grievances and protagonists fight one against another using traditional and /or conventional weapons. When fighting lasts for days, months or years and tolls are being reported every day by local, regional and international media, alarming emergency situation and when protagonists are most likely tired of fighting because no one side tends to win the battle; protagonists are pressurized to invite the international community. This is when and how international organizations and/or regional blocks start the role of meditation seeking a cease fire.

Once a cease fire is reached and signed on, multidimensional peacekeeping forces are called on after the consent of the conflicting parties, their role is to maintain a truce between fighters, to protect civilians, actively prevent conflict, and reduce violence. At the same time as they maintain peace, international peacekeeping staffs assist also in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, facilitate the political process, protect and promote human rights.

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Moreover, international peacekeeping strengthens security and empowers host's national authorities so that they are able to assume those responsibilities once peacekeepers leave the country, because the absence of the new trained security forces and capable administrative and political institutions can put again the country in the security impasse.

Theory: International peacekeeping brings peace, security and stabilization
Concepts On International Peacekeeping

Conceptualizing peacekeeping is not an easy task. The UN distinguishes between two generations of peacekeeping: Traditional and complex multidimensional. Traditional peacekeeping forces focus on monitoring cease-fires; complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations support the implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement, Karen, A. Mingst (2017). Scholars have pointed to a possible third generation focusing on employment of military means to implement a humanitarian mandate; this may practically lead to entering a new era of enforcement peacekeeping.

Despite decades of experience with international peacekeeping missions, peacekeeping has never been guided by an established theory or doctrine, Oldrich, Bures (2007). As a matter of fact, as argued above, there is still no consensus among the subject's practitioners regarding the definition of the very term "peacekeeping." The UN traditionally defines ''*peacekeeping*'' as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers undertaken by United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict, Karen, A. Mingst, *et al.* (2017). As Trevor Findlay (2002:4) has noted, "the term peacekeeping has been invented long after praxis had began and improvisation has characterized its evolution ever since."

According to Oldrich, Bures (2007:412) there is, nevertheless, general agreement in the relevant literature that concept of peacekeeping operations was invented by Dag Hammarskjold (UN Secretary General 1953-1961) and Lester B. Pearson (UN General Assembly President in 1952-1953 and Canadian Prime Minister 1963-1968) in a few frantic days at the beginning of the November 1956 Suez Crisis. Similarly, much the writing on the subject of peacekeeping during the Cold War period has performed by diplomats and military people with experience in the field. This, according to Featherston (2000:191), "has tended to limit the accumulation knowledge on peacekeeping as an intervention to case studies, with little generalized value beyond a tentative list of do's and do not's." The majority of influential conflict resolution theorists hardly mentioned peacekeeping and where peacekeeping was touched upon in the 1960s and 1970s, it was seen as "a device of an older form of conflict management, conflict containment, conflict suppression, dealing with symptoms and not concerned with fundamental resolution" (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2005:5).

The earliest attempts to think conceptually about peacekeeping operations began in the early 1980s by identifying the roles that peacekeepers ought to fulfill and then moving on to show how they might fulfill such roles more effectively. For example, Indar Jit Rikhye (1984:221, 234, 245) has insisted that peace operations fulfill three key functions.

(1) They provide a mechanism for resolving conflict without the direct intervention of the Cold War superpowers, thereby reducing the risk of cataclysmic escalation.
(2) They mobilize international society to make a commitment to the maintenance of peace.
(3) They provide "a diplomatic key opening the way to further negotiations for a peaceful resolution of conflicts."

A number of authors have attempted to analyze peacekeeping using rational choice models. Alistair Smith and Allan Stam (2003) examined peacekeeping within the context of a random walk model of warfare and war termination. The results of their study suggest that peacekeeping forces offer the possibility of an artificially constructed boundary between the warring parties and, therefore, drastically improve the prospects for peace. Johan Galtung (1976:282-304), for example, suggested that peacekeeping is best seen as negative and "dissociative strategy that merely tries to return the parties to the status quo ante."

In his quest for explanations of the success of peacekeeping missions in containing conflict, Diehl (1993:182) considered three sets of factors: (i) the characteristics of the force itself, including internal characteristics of the operation (force composition, particularly with regard to neutrality), operational characteristics (command and control, integration of national contingents), and locus of deployment (size and terrain of area, population density); (ii) the characteristics of the mission authorization (nature of mandate and financing); and (iii) the political and military context, including the nature of the dispute, the behavior of primary disputants, and the actions of third-party states and sub-national actors.
From a methodological perspective, one problem with this series of key explanatory variables lies in the fact that they seem to be derived inductively rather than deductively and therefore come short of fulfilling Diehl's original aspiration for a theoretical explanation.

Implications for Conflict Dynamics and Peacebuilding
When international peacekeepers side with one side in a conflict, whether by helping it extend state authority or defeat enemy combatants, this substantially affects conflict and political dynamics at a particular time. It confers legitimacy on one set of actors while delegitimizing the claims of others. It also empowers specific actors against others in ways that might be unsustainable in the long run, and it leads to make conflict situation more worse rather than bringing peace and stabilization as a key to peacekeeping mandate.

Assumptions On International Peacekeeping:
International Peacekeeping operations are supposed to be deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. This distinguishes them from enforcement operations, consent requires a commitment by the parties to a political process. In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace
Consent is not only for normative reasons, but also for purely practical ones. It is usually obtained through a peace agreement among parties to the conflict.
This assumption is essential because consent is sought to make the work and tasks of international peacekeepers achievable.

Peacekeeping missions must implement their mandates without favor or prejudice to any party, here comes the role of impartiality. It is intended to ensure the continued cooperation of all key political players so that the international peacekeeping forces can successfully implement its mandate. This assumption of impartiality is one of key elements as it is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict.

The principle of nonuse of force except in self-defense. It is widely understood that peacekeepers may use force at the tactical level, if acting in self-defense or defense of the mandate. Peacekeepers can use all necessary means to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the aftermath political process, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or to assist national authorities in maintaining law and order of post-conflict while training local or national security forces which in return will take over the task of maintaining national peace and security. The latter requires additional mandate from relevant international intergovernmental organization in order to be carried out under legal framework, Mateja, Peter (2015: 358-360). *The principle of nonuse of force*, in the contemporary multi-dimensional peacekeeping can be overturned by chapter VII of the United Nations and this mandate to use force has been used in a couple of examples.

For this theory to be applicable, it is assumed that before deployment of international peacekeeping forces, the main parties to the conflict should accept to cease hostilities and reach a peace agreement, then officially invite international peacekeeping forces to maintain peace and security and to assist in a post-conflict political process, while international peacekeeping forces undertake the operations, they have to be impartial and not to use force except in self-defense. These assumptions are of paramount importance because without them the tasks and goals of the international peacekeeping forces which are stabilization of the host country (peace and security) will not be achievable.

Figure 1. Mutually reinforcing determinants based on John Gerring's Basic Causal Diagram

Source: John Gerring, (2010) P.144)

According to this Basic Causal Diagram:
International Peacekeeping (X) is a causal factor of theoretical interest;
 (**Z, Actors**) Causal mechanism or pathway by which X affects

Hypotheses

a. International peacekeepers lead to stabilization once they are sticking to the core principle of *consent;*

b. International peacekeepers lead to stabilization once they are sticking to the core principle of *impartiality; and*

c. International peacekeepers lead to stabilization once they are sticking to the core principle of *nonuse of force*, except if they have mandate to use force.

Case Structure

Figure 2: Cases structure

Dependent Variable	DV Status	Independent variable	Independent variable
		PKFs formation and its mandate from UNSC	Figures of PKF
Liberia	Middle success	UNMIL Formation: Sept. 19th, 2003 End 30 March 2018. Chapter VII: Use force	15,000 personnel
Mozambique	Success	UNOMOZ Founded: Oct 13, 1992; ended December 1994.	6.625 troops and military support personnel, 354 military observers, 1.144 civil police officers, 355 international staff, 506 local staff and 900 election observers
Rwanda	Failure	UNAMIR I Formation: Oct 5th, 1993 UNAMIR II: 17 May 1994 End all mission in 1996 Nonuse of force except self-defense	UNAMIRI : 2,500 personnel UNAMIR II: 5,500 personnel

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Factors for Success and Failure of Peacekeeping Operations

The results of the peacekeeping efforts have been varied. There were definite failures for instance in Angola, Somalia and Rwanda.

There are nine factors for success and failure that can explain the differences in contribution to durable peace by UN peacekeeping operations.
1) *The parties are sincere and willing to cooperate with the implementation of the operation*. In order for the conflicting parties to be sincere they need to perceive the operation as an important part of a peace process, which they view as the best alternative for the conflict. But if the parties only hope to restart the conflict once the United Nations leaves, the results cannot be lasting.

2) *The operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties*. Parties generally perceive their security to increase if the cease-fire is monitored by a credible, large, well-trained, well-equipped, and robustly mandated force.

3) *The operation has sufficient attention to the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth*. One can perhaps reach negative peace, but if the causes of conflict persist, it is likely to eventually flair up again.

4) *The operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties.* In particular, the support of the permanent members of the Security Council is important because they need to accept the necessary resolutions and mandate and may also need to pressure proxies into compliance. The co-operation from neighboring countries is essential because these countries often support one of the parties and the implementation of some 'policy tools' in a peacekeeping operation may require their assistance.

5) *The operation is deployed timely and at the right time*. If the timing is right, a peacekeeping operation can aid and play an accommodating role. If the conflict is not yet ripe, the role of an operation which is supposed to monitor a cease-fire on the basis of the consent of the parties, is much more limited.

6) *The operation is implemented by competent personnel under competent leadership, and with clear command structures.* The leadership is especially important with regard to the continuing mediation role during the presence of an operation. Furthermore, competent personnel are the basis for each 'policy tool' in a peacekeeping operation.
7) *the operation is part of a long term approach*. In order to contribute sufficiently to the end of physical violence and, especially, to addressing the causes of the conflict, sufficient time is needed. In the absence of sufficient follow-up, it is likely that the short period of presence is not enough to allow durable changes to take root.

8) *The 'policy tools' implemented in the operation are coordinated within the operation, as well as externally*. The implementation of many 'policy tools' within a peacekeeping operation depends on the implementation of other 'policy tools'. Co-ordination is essential for optimum implementation; and

9) *the operation provides 'ownership*. Ownership' is important both during and after the presence of an operation. Parties, in the end, need to be enabled to decide for themselves what they together deem necessary, in order to ensure that an operation delivers what they require, Jaïr van der Lijn (2010:30-32).

Failures and success of the Peacekeeping forces, owing to a series of failures in the 1990s, the UN ordered a comprehensive review of UN Peacekeeping Operations . The Brahimi Report concluded that 'the UN has repeatedly failed to meet the challenges. The same remains true even today. The failure of the Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda can be attributed to a combination of strategic and operational reasons. Even though a peace agreement was signed before deployment of the PKO, decision-makers were unaware of the presence of the strong undercurrent amongst the Hutu community, which was against any political reconciliation. At the operational level, the mission was understrength and some of the contingents lacked the will to intervene to protect the civilians from the wrath of the Hutu militias when the genocide began in April 1994, A.K. Bardalai (2018:7).

Peacekeeping operations' members have differences as an international intervention force, but there are also numerous similarities. In particular, most foreign peacebuilders share common practices, habits, and narratives when they are deployed on the ground (Autesserre 2014b). These shared ways of working and thinking are "'free-floating,' transportable, mobile, and transient," and thus can be readily "transplanted in any" conflict and post-conflict context (Verma 2011).

Explaining success of international Peacekeeping
The results of the peacekeeping efforts have been varied. There were definite successes in Namibia and Mozambique and middle success in Liberia.
The new operations were successful. In El Salvador and Mozambique, for example, UN peacekeeping provided ways to achieve self-sustaining peace. The primary successes of the UN have been in the areas of elections and communications (after peace agreement), diplomacy and hindsight analysis of failures, Tomas W. Jacobson (2017).

The results of the peacekeeping efforts have been varied. There were definite failures for instance in Angola, Somalia and Rwanda and definite successes in Namibia and Mozambique. Mozambique-UN Peacekeeping Action 1992-1994 is a welcome study which offers lessons that should be taken into account if future peacekeeping operations are to succeed.

The author draws examples from other conflicts in Africa such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda where "armed conflicts" grew out of domestic competition for power and deep-rooted antagonisms. The author goes on to argue that a peace agreement that comprehensively represented the commitment of parties in conflict with guarantees provided by the international community is the best grounding for success, he suggests that the experiences gained from several African countries involved in conflicts led him to suggest six elements that were likely to increase the prospects for a successful outcome of peace building interventions in Africa. These are (a) a credible peace formula deriving legitimacy from the warring parties, which is supported by regional, continental and multilateral organizations. It must have acceptable procedures on the

timetables, verifications of progress and resolution of disputes and (b) manageable components on composition and deployment, (c) monitoring of the cease-fire, (d) international support, (e) clear rules and, (f) capacity building. Mozambique was generally successful in providing elements in a, c and d but performed poorly in terms of b, e, and f. The peacekeeping operation was answerable to both national and international expectations and it had a closely monitored cease-fire, Richard Synge (2000:99-100).

The intellectual history of the literature with respect to the issue of peacekeeping's effectiveness could be described as follows: first, a long period including the sporadic studies during the Cold War; second, the new found interest in peacekeeping in the 1990s, which turned quickly to a focus on failure, dysfunction, and unintended consequences; third, the advent of systematic qualitative and quantitative studies that have tested peacekeeping's impact empirically, showing that despite its limitations, peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool. Virginia P. Fortna and Lise M. Howard (2008).

Reflecting the pessimistic mood in the Policy oriented literature has been the tenor of the works in "critical theory," which also focus primarily on the historical period of peacekeeping in the 1990s. The critical turn emerged in opposition to "problem-solving theory" (Bellamy 2004, p. 18) and was critical in the sense of being interested in exploring the negative side effects and consequences (both intended and unintended) of peacekeeping. With the close of the decade, however, the political tide shifted back in favor of peacekeeping. After scathing, self-critical UN reports on the genocides in Rwanda (Carlsson et al. 1999) and Srebrenica, a more positive mood began to envelop the UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had previously served as the head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and thus was intimately familiar with and interested in the issues, had won a second term. His stature as a trusted hand at peacekeeping was matched by that of the new US Ambassador to the UN, Richard Holbrooke, who had played a pivotal role in securing the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999).

On 18 August 2003 the three major parties to the Liberian conflict, namely the government of Liberia, LURD and MODEL, signed the 'Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (CPA) in Accra, Ghana. The CPA provided for a two and a half year transitional period in which the affairs of state would be carried out by a power-sharing transitional government. The transitional period was to culminate in the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in October and November 2005, with the new government assuming office in January 2006. The early provisions of the CPA addressed critical questions of security.

Thus the Agreement formalized a cease-fire that had held since June 2003, when peace negotiations had first begun, and called for the intervention of a Chapter VII United Nations peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire and support the implementation of the peace process as a whole – a role which was to be played by UNMIL Shortly after the signing of the CPA the UN Security Council formally created the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

UNMIL was established as a multidimensional peacekeeping operation with a mandate to provide security and stability in Liberia, as well as wide-ranging support to the Liberian peace process and the efforts of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to consolidate peace. UNMIL was conceived as a multidimensional peace operation whose primary

goal was to provide the security and stability necessary to enable the full implementation of the CPA. Yet both the CPA and the UN Security Council envisaged quite an expansive role for UNMIL, falling between the extremes of modestly monitoring a ceasefire and ambitiously assuming the full responsibilities of government, Jeremy Farrall (2012:317-318).

Explaining the failure of International Peacekeeping

Some efforts failed perhaps as the result of an overly optimistic assessment of what UN peacekeeping could accomplish. While complex missions in Cambodia and Mozambique were ongoing, the Security Council dispatched peacekeepers to conflict zones like Somalia, where neither cease-fires nor the consent of all the parties in conflict had been secured. These operations did not have the manpower, nor were they supported by the political will to implement their mandates. The failures most notably the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda led to a period of retrenchment and self-examination in UN peacekeeping. In 1999, having decided that a reform of UN peacekeeping was imperative, Secretary General Kofi Annan undertook a comprehensive assessment of events leading to the fall of Srebrenica and also commissioned an independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the Rwanda genocide of 1994. These assessments highlighted the need to improve the capacity of the UN to conduct peacekeeping operations and in particular to ensure rapid deployment and mandates that met the needs on the ground, Nisar-ul-Haq (2004).

Governments and public opinion in many countries have increasingly questioned whether peacekeeping is enough. Its reliance on the consent and cooperation of the parties has, it is said, shown it to be incapable of taking the forceful action required in situations like those in Bosnia and Somalia, Marrack Goulding (1993). Failure of PKOs in former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda is often attributed to the mandate, which was flawed and unachievable, A.K. Bardalai (2018)

The Arusha Accords between government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) a mostly Tutsi rebel group, ending decades of conflict that was rooted in Belgian colonialism and ethnic tensions. Both parties requested a U.N. peacekeeping operation to assist in implementing the provisions of the Arusha Accords, including establishing a transitional government and instituting a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program, among other goals. Through a fraught process, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) debated the mandate and capacity of the peacekeeping operation. Eventually, this led to a narrow mandate for supporting the implementation of the Arusha Accords, and did not allow peacekeepers to use force. The UNSC passed a resolution to establish UNAMIR on October 5, 1993 with a small force of 2,548 troops and a narrow mandate that was "far short of what would have been needed to guarantee implementation of the Accords." UNAMIR was "constrained by the relatively small size of the force as well as by a determination not to repeat the mistakes made in Somalia.''

While this debate about UNAMIR was taking place at the United Nations, the United States was engaged in a domestic political debate about the future of U.S. involvement in peacekeeping operations. As such, the United States was reluctant to support UNAMIR from the beginning. Richard Clarke, the National Security Advisor for peacekeeping at the White House, felt that

"news from Rwanda only confirmed a deep skepticism about the viability of UN deployments.'' This political debate and eventual call for a drawdown of U.S. peacekeeping activities would gain more momentum in the aftermath of the Somalia crisis in which U.S. troops were killed in a failed military option, during which one of the bodies of the soldiers was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, making nightly news across the United States.

In the autumn of 1993, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire was named force commander of the peacekeeping operation consisting of contingents from Bangladesh, Ghana, Belgium, and other countries. The first troops arrived in Rwanda in early November, and the bulk of the force arrived on the ground in December, less than six months before the start of the genocide. From the beginning Dallaire and his troops struggled with a lack of provisions and support, never having received approval of standard Rules of Engagement (ROE) which guide the daily procedures of the mission, Willard, Emily A. (2018:144-145).

When ten Belgian peacekeeping troops were killed on the first day of the genocide, Belgium initially requested reinforcements, and many members of the UNSC called for an expansion of UNAMIR's mandate and to send reinforcements. On April 15, the United States representative to the UN dropped "a bombshell" on the UN Security Council calling for the full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops, despite a strong movement among non-aligned countries on the UNSC to extend the mandate and send reinforcements. Weeks into the genocide on April 21, the UNSC passed a resolution to withdraw the majority of UNAMIR troops, leaving a "skeletal staff" of 270 down from approximately 2,500, Blanton, Tom and Emily Willard. (2015). Further clarity is needed: How did the United Nations Security Council come to this decision to withdraw UNAMIR troops? What role did the United States play and why? Willard, Emily A. (2018:146).

Literature survey
My study differs from these surveyed literatures because it lies on the comparative case studies with a historical successful case, middle successful case and failure case of international peacekeeping operations; while the surveyed literatures, for instance Jaïr van der Lijn (2010) focused on the failure's analysis with South Sudan as case and A.K. Bardalai (2018) who stressed on the causes of failure in general. Moreover, other studies that were surveyed in this literature focused on international peacekeeping in different way from my study's approaches as aforementioned above.

3. RESEARCH METHODS
The study used multi-method research: Qualitative and archival sources [both quantitative and qualitative] with comparative case studies. Qualitative Research has been used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations. It provided insights into how peacekeeping operates, helps or renders assistance to local or national authorities in the host country. Furthermore, the preexisting data [archival sources] have been used to compare cases in this research paper and enable researcher to highlight successful peacekeeping, and the reasons behind hose failure cases in different peacekeeping operations.
Cases Selection

For each of the selected cases whether middle success/ success or failure, International Peacekeeping operations will be investigated and assessed on the basis of:
(1) Type of PKOs, did they come from well known funded military expenditure, with a highly training or did they come from a country which depends on both military assistance and training. And what mandate was assigned to those PKOs, chapter VI, or Chapter VII ? (2) Peacekeeping's figures [numbers].

Liberia

The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) a rebel group led by Charles Taylor, launched an insurrection in December 1989 against Doe's government with the backing of neighboring countries such as Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. This triggered the 1st Liberian Civil War. The rebels soon split into various factions fighting one another. The Economic Community Monitoring Group under the Economic Community of the West Africa States organized a military task force to intervene in the crisis. From 1989 to 1996, more than 200,000 Liberians died and a million others were displaced into refugee camps in neighboring countries. A peace deal between warring parties was reached in 1995, leading to Taylor's election as president in 1997.

The 2nd Liberian civil war began in 1999 when Liberians United Reconciliation and Democracy, a rebel group based in the northwest of the country, launched an armed insurrection against Taylor. In March 2003, a second rebel group, Movement for Democracy in Liberia, began launching attacks against Taylor from the southeast.

Peace talks between the factions began in Accra in June of that year, and Taylor was indicted by the Special Court of the Sierra Leone for crimes against humanity the same month. By July 2003, the rebels had launched an assault on Monrovia. Under heavy pressure from the international community and the domestic Women of Liberia Mass Action for Peace movement Taylor resigned in August 2003 and went into exile in Nigeria. A peace deal was signed later that month. The United Nations Mission in Liberia began arriving in September 2003 to provide security and monitor the peace accord, and an interim government took power the following October.

The subsequent 2005 elections were internationally regarded as the most free and fair in Liberian history.   The United Nations Mission in Liberia was a peacekeeping force established in September 2003 to monitor a ceasefire agreement in Liberia following the resignation of President Charles Taylor and the conclusion of the Second Liberian Civil War. The peacekeeping mission formally withdrew on 30 March 2018

Mozambique

During most of the civil war, the FRELIMO-formed central government was unable to exercise effective control outside of urban areas, many of which were cut off from the capital. RENAMO, rebel group controlled areas included up to 50% of the rural areas in several provinces. On 19 October 1986, Samora Machel died in aircraft crash. Machel's successor Joaquim Chissano implemented sweeping changes in the country, starting reforms such as changing from Marxism

to capitalism, and began peace talks with RENAMO. The new constitution enacted in 1990 provided for a multiparty political system, market based economy and free elections. The civil war ended in October 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords, first brokered by the Christian Council of Mozambique (Council of Protestant Churches) and then taken over by Community of Sant Egidio.

International Peacekeeping (ONUMOZ) of the United Nations established by United Nations Security Council resolution 797 and it contributed successfully to peace and security and its mandate ended in December 1994.

Mozambique held elections in 1994, which were accepted by most political parties as free and fair although still contested by many nationals and observers alike. FRELIMO won, under Joaquim Chissano, while RENAMO, led by Afonso Dhlakama, ran as the official opposition.

RWANDA

The 1993 Arusha Accords between the government of Rwanda and RPF rebel group, which led to a cease fire. The cease-fire ended on April 6th, 1994 when former President Habyarimana's plane shot down near Kigali airport killing him and president of Burundi. The shooting down of the plane, as some scholars contended, served as the catalyst for the genocide[2] in Rwanda, which began within a few hours after plane's crash, and the official Rwanda's government position is that the genocide was premeditated, it wasn't happen because of the presidential plane crash. Over the course of approximately 100 days, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu were killed; and many Twa ethnic group members were also killed, despite not being directly targeted.

The Tutsi RPF restarted their offensive, and took control of the country methodically, gaining control of the whole country by mid-July in 1994. The international response to the genocide was limited, with major powers reluctant to strengthen the already overstretched UN peacekeeping forces. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR I) was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 on October 5th, 1993. It was intended to assist in the implementation of the Arusha Accords, signed on August 4th, 1993, which was meant to end the Rwandan Civil War. By signing the Accords, both parties included deployment of international peacekeeping. During the genocide against Tutsi[3], international peacekeeping was unable to stop killings and subsequently most of the peacekeepers left the country. In May 1994, UN Security Council authorized UNAMIR II which was deployed and its mandate was ended in 1996. With regards to the international peacekeeping in Rwanda, this was an apparent historical failure of United Nations peacekeeping and the international community.

4. CONCLUSION

Leaders put policies that are not holistic in nature, rather they adopt policies, in many cases, that tend to favor incumbents in different developing countries; thus wars are inevitable. Some

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The U.N. General Assembly, on December 23rd, 2003 adopted resolution A/RES/58/234 designating April 7th, as the Int'l Day of Reflection on [2] the Genocide. On January 26th, 2018, the Title of the annual observance amended: U.N. G.A adopted draft res. A/72/L.31, designating April 7th, as the Int'l Day of Reflection on the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda. It also recalled that during genocide against the Tutsi, Hutu and others who opposed it were killed.

Genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda, this appellation was adopted by the United Nations as we have previously seen; however some countries [3] such as U.S. and U.K still question on why not to include other ethnic group(s) in the appellation.

scholars and civil society organizations together with non-governmental organizations do blame the situation on politicians. No U.N. peacekeeping operation can be authorized, deployed, or withdrawn without support of veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council, [U.S., Russia, China, U.K., and France].

The history shows that U.N peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East[4]. Since then until now things have changed and more than 70 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the UN. And now more than 100,000 UN peacekeeping work to stabilize most of volatile conflict zones in the world.

As we have seen in this article which shows example of cases: failure, successful, and half-successful. Rwanda's case was totally a failure of international community, on its top United Nations Security Council veto powers: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States. On the other hand, Mozambique's case was an example to follow for future UN peacekeeping operations; as mentioned above in the UN peacekeeping tasks; in the early time of peacekeeping, Mozambique went through those stages until successful elections. Although Liberian elections in 2005 were internationally credited with transparent, free and fair; this was achieved in the second civil war after Liberia suffered from different factions of civil wars. Furthermore, the success of peacekeeping operation depends on the likelihood of host country not being a target of superpowers that being said, if there's a conflict of interest with regards to economic or politico-geostrategic factors, the success will unlikely be achieved.

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