NO SILVER BULLETS: WHY COUNTER -TERRORISM AND ANTI -TERRORISM DON'T WORK

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ABSTRACT
Terrorism literature is replete with the so-called "causes" of terrorism. With the potential causes of terrorism being so widespread, suggested "solutions" to terrorism run the gamut as well. Everything from economic aid and more open trade, to more military intervention and better intelligence, to increased diplomacy, increased political rights and civil liberties, religious reform, more stable party systems and American hegemony have all been offered as potential solutions to terrorism. Far from advocating a dovish response to terrorist activity, this article argues that thestrategic approach is the smarter and more effective way forward.

Key Words: Terrorism, Islamic Extremism. Anti-terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Strategic Theory

INTRODUCTION
As the title indicates, this article addresses why counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures do not work. The article begins with empirical data demonstrating that, despite efforts to combat terrorism, incidents of terrorist violence have grown more numerous and more deadly over the past three decades. Next, the article explores why this might be. Contrary to the once commonly-held assumption that harsher countermeasures served as a deterrent, a vast body of literature supports just the opposite conclusion—rather than deterrence, harsh countermeasures result in backlash and increased support for the actors engaged in terrorist violence.

The Empirical data
Terrorist attacks took 4,798 lives in the ten years between 1970 and 1979, and that number rose to 51,797 lives between 1990 and 1996 demonstrating a stark increase in the number of fatalities despite a decreasing number of attacks (Stern 2000b).[1]

In accordance with this general trend, transnational terrorism has also become less frequent but more lethal. There were 5,431 transnational terrorist attacks between 1980 and 1989 resulting in 4,684 deaths. And while the number of transnational terrorist attacks between 1990 and 1999 dropped to 3,824, the number of resulting deaths was 2,468 (an average of 1.5 deaths per incident, up from 1.2 in the 1980s), making the attacks fewer in number yet more lethal (Pillar 2001).

Of course, how one defines terrorism is a critical issue when considering these figures.[1]

While terrorist attacks decreased overall in the 1990s as compared to previous decades, closer examination of the distribution of attacks reveals that this trend was reversing. There were 19% fewer terrorist incidents between 1990 and 1994 than there were between 1995 and 1999. Yet the attacks in the second period produced more than double the amount of casualties than the first (Enders and Sandler 2000). So while the increase in incidents was under 20%, the casualties more than doubled making the attacks in the second period far more lethal.

The next decade saw a substantial increase in terrorist incidents. Suicide terrorism also increased substantially with eighty percent of all suicide attacks since 1968 occurring after September 11, 2001. The year 2004 saw more suicide attacks than any year previous, and the number continued to grow in 2005 with more than one suicide attack per day on average in Iraq alone (Desouza and Hensgen 2007).

The trend continued into 2006. The U.S. State Department issued a report in May 2007 revealing that terrorist attacks in 2006 increased by more than 25% over 2005, with fatalities increasing some 40 percent (U.S. Department of State 2006, Whitelaw 2007). Islamist web sites also increased from less than 20 in 2001 to over 3,000 in 2006 (Atran 2006).

Clearly, current antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies have failed to prevent the death toll due to terrorism from increasing more than tenfold every two decades. Even within the EU, criticism abounds regarding the ineffectiveness of existing measures (e.g. Bamford 2004; AI 2010).

Terrorism literature is replete with the so-called "causes" of terrorism. With the potential causes of terrorism being so widespread, suggested "solutions" to terrorism run the gamut as well. Everything from economic aid (Cragin and Chalk 2003) and more open trade (Bremmer 2003), to more military intervention (Howard 2003) and better intelligence (Foxell 2004), to increased diplomacy (Slater 2006), increased political rights and civil liberties (Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. 2006; Wade and Reiter 2007), religious reform (Venkatraman 2007) more stable party systems (Piazza 2006), and American hegemony (Mallaby 2002) have all been offered as potential solutions to terrorism. In this article, we will explore these remedies and demonstrate why they cannot work.

Miller (2007) employs a two-part typology to frame the ongoing debate over the solution to terrorism as essentially one that pits those who promote a more aggressive response to terrorism (O'Brien 1985; Johnson 1986; Carr 1996; Betts 2002; Bremmer 2003) against those that champion a more diplomatic approach (Koopmans 1993; Charters 1994; Tarrow and Tollefson 1994; Sederberg 1995; Ginges 1997; Heymann 2000). Similarly, Sinai (2005) explores a coercive/conciliatory approach as well and concludes that in the case of a military stalemate, states are often better off employing the latter.

Post (2005) suggests a four-fold typology that consists of (1) preventing individuals from joining groups that employ terrorism, (2) creating dissention within such groups, (3) blocking popular and financial support to such groups and (4) providing exit opportunities and support for individuals entangled in them.

Another approach is to simply view all responses to terrorism as either counterterrorist or antiterrorist.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND ANTITERRORISM

Counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures represent the gamut of possible responses to terrorist violence. Hence, virtually all responses fall under one label or the other. The point of this discussion is threefold. First, from an academic perspective, it is fruitful and necessary to fully understand the concepts one employs (Smith 2005).

Second, it is important to emphasize the fact that, like terrorism, counterterrorism and antiterrorism are also merely tactics. They are simply means to a desired end. While tactical means are necessary as part of an overall strategy, unless they are employed toward a strategic goal, they are irrational and incomprehensible. Even worse, when used in the absence of strategy, tactical measures can actually help to erode the legitimacy of the target government.

Finally, this section discusses the similarities between policies that rely solely on tactical approaches and those that attempt to solve the problem of terrorism by fighting its causes.

COUNTERTERRORISM

Defined as an offensive military operation in the United States Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Nagl et al. 2008), counterterrorism largely entails reactive measures such as freezing the financial assets of known terrorist organizations, the creation of international treaties and uniform legislation condemning terrorism, and various efforts to apprehend known terrorists.

The U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism officially declared the 9/11 attacks an act of war against the United States and made both counterterrorism and antiterrorism national security priorities (Bush 2003). Defense of the homeland (antiterrorism) was only a partial solution, however. The Bush administration also insisted that the war on terror be brought to the perpetrators of terror wherever they may be. The war was to be global. Therefore, America's counterterrorism efforts must be global as well. The official U.S. stance on the war made the very narrow assumption that anyone not allied with the United States was allied with the terrorists. A more effective approach might have been to state that anyone not with the terrorists was with the United States. (Bergen 2011).

The 9/11 attacks also resulted in the passage of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), 1368, 1373, and 1377, which called upon all member states to join the U.S. in the fight against the perpetrators and sponsors of terrorism and to pass legislation that criminalized terrorism. Even though the GWOT received considerable UN support, several UN member states viewed U.S. reliance on a military solution as ineffective at best, and at times even disastrous (Sampson and Onuoha 2011).

The main problem with counterterrorism efforts is that there is little uniformity across states when it comes to defining, documenting, and punishing acts of terrorism (Shelton 1998).

Another major drawback to counterterrorism is that it is often counter-productive, especially if the government involved is viewed as overly harsh or repressive (Solomon 2015).

ANTITERRORISM

Antiterrorism can be thought of as defensive or preventative attempts to decrease a society's vulnerability to terrorism, such as hardening likely targets and increasing airport security. The problem with antiterrorism measures is that they are often costly, disruptive to daily routine, and largely inconsequential as terrorists can simply choose alternative targets. The current anti-terrorism policy has cost the United States billions with very little measurable results (McGovern 2011).

Antiterrorism often violates human rights as well. For example, one standard US anti-terrorism measure entails checking all passengers traveling within the United States and US territories against terrorist watch lists. As of 2001, the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) requires all airlines to transmit Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on all passengers aboard their aircraft before entering the United States. DHS has also issued no-fly orders and detained thousands of innocent people. Even the late Senator Ted Kennedy and singer/songwriter Cat Stevens were both detained. The EU has claimed that the policy violates data privacy rights.
In addition to the conflict DHS has encountered with the EU, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has filed a class action law suit on behalf of US citizens believed to have been wrongfully detained by DHS based on PNR data (Brouwer 2009; Byrne 2012).

US anti-terrorism measures also include the blacklisting of state sponsors of terrorism such as Sudan, Syria, Cuba, and Iran. Nigeria was also added to the blacklist after the failed Christmas Day bombing on Northwest Airlines Flight 253, when a Nigerian citizen, Umar Farouk Abdalmutallah, attempted to detonate a small explosive device he had hidden in his underwear. Abdalmutallah was a member of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based in Yemen (Harnicsh and Zimmerman 2010).
Nigeria was later removed from the blacklist upon its agreement to publicly condemn all forms of terrorism, pass legislation aimed at countering terrorism, improve its security at Nigerian airports, and place air marshals on board aircraft destined for the United States (Sampson and Onuoha 2011).
Of course, blacklisting state sponsors of terrorism can only do so much, especially considering the dramatic decline in state-sponsored terrorism following the collapse of the Soviet Union. What is needed is an effective deterrent for non-state actors, who have more than compensated for the decline in state-sponsored terrorism with fewer, but more lethal, attacks.

The attacks of 11 September, 2011 (9/11) posed a three-fold challenge to the EU for which it was ill-prepared. The EU suddenly had to prove itself a credible partner in the military and political war on terror, increase internal security and defend its external borders as well (Den Boer and Monar 2002).

Den Boer (2003, p.1) argues that the 9/11 attacks served as a pretext for an "unprecedented wave of policy interventions within the European Union," passed in haste with little or no consideration of human rights.

Bossong (2008) adds that the EU's action plan for combatting terrorism, hastily pushed through by integration-minded policy entrepreneurs, ignores the more important strategic dimension and is therefore flawed. One such dimension is financing.

Napoleoni (2006) insists that a principal reason the West is losing the war on terror is due to a lack of a global policy to prevent terrorist financing. Napoleoni reminds us that, following 9/11, some $200 billion in Saudi funds were transferred out of the Unites States, much of it being reinvested in the EU where she contends that border and financial controls are still too lenient to prevent the financing of terrorism.

The bottom line is that without attention to broader strategic considerations, even the more comprehensive European approach to combatting terrorism is flawed. Having considered the limitations of the more customary approaches to counterterrorism and antiterrorism, I will now explore the danger of relying solely on tactical counterterrorism and antiterrorism as a response to strategic terrorism.

Military versus Legal Approaches to Counterterrorism

Targeted killings are a popular practice employed by Israel. When Israel decided to assassinate Salah Shehada, one of the senior leaders of Hamas in 2002, the bomb that took Shehada's life also claimed the lives of at least 14 civilians including nine children. Hamas vowed revenge with the support of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who came out to protest and mourn the dead (Byman 2006).

Targeted killings are also a popular practice employed by the United States. Unfortunately, while notorious for the collateral damage they inflict, targeted killings are also limited in efficiency and effectiveness, and operations are often based on erroneous intelligence (Cordesman 2006).

One of the supposed weaknesses of al Qaeda was the vulnerability of its leadership. However, Van Raemdonck (2012) points out that of the 581 militants assassinated in 2010, only thirteen were high-value targets. Yet the accompanying civilian casualties and collateral damage provided the terrorists with a powerful political weapon. Still, the United States continues to strongly favor military solutions over diplomacy. But at what cost?

As Howie (2012) maintains, witnesses are the true targets of terror. The same can be said of counterterrorism. It is not only the victims (or potential victims) of counterterrorist attacks that protest such methods. Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) argues that orthodox approaches to counterterrorism are nothing more than hegemonic attempts to maintain the status quo (Jackson et al. 2011). Even among proponents of orthodox approaches, opposing views prevail. For instance, the Clinton administration framed terrorism as a criminal issue[2] while the George W. Bush administration framed it as a military phenomenon (Bush 2001).

For instance, the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 reintroduced guilt by association as a precedent in the criminal [2] prosecution of those suspected of engaging in terrorist violence (Cole and Dempsey 2002). However, already in 1996, the case was being presented to replace civilian criminal trials with military tribunals in the prosecution of

Moreover, the Bush administration's approach caused division even among proponents of a military solution because the concept of a war on terror fought largely against illegal combatants was also a political construct−one that sparked considerable controversy concerning its lack of legal legitimacy (Nanda 2009).

As both non-citizens and non-state actors, illegal combatants are neither entitled to protection under the Geneva Convention nor the United States Constitution. This approach afforded the Bush administration the opportunity to circumvent due process of the law; an opportunity that it took full advantage of through questionable detention practices, cruel and inhumane interrogation practices, targeted killings and extraordinary rendition (ICRC 2007; Kreimer 2007).

While it never adopted the Clinton administration's view of terrorism as a criminal issue,
the Obama administration shied away from the military construct as well (Pleming 2009; Engle 2010). And although Obama made some effort to ensure the humane treatment of terrorist suspects and detainees,[3] they were largely ineffective (U.S. Department of Justice 2009; Corcoran 2010; Huskey 2010).
Yet for all his efforts to avoid the politically-charged term "war on terror," and despite his attempts to bring his administration's policies on terrorism back within the rule of law, one could argue that Obama also greatly intensified the GWOT. For instance, the Obama administration increased the use of unarmed aerial drone strikes in spite of significant collateral damage (Mayer 2009; Williams 2010; O'Connell 2011).[4]

While the Obama administration perpetuated the GWOT, it never fully addressed the legal controversies associated with it (Thompson 2013). Nor has Trump. Hence, the division among proponents of a military solution to terrorism continues. Meanwhile, America's foreign policy on terrorism has changed very little since the Bush administration despite Obama's more tolerant tone.

Although Article 51 of the UN Charter provides member states with the right to self-defense, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity of another sovereign member state without the existence of a real and imminent threat. Thus, the 2003 US invasion of Iraq was questionable at best from a legal standpoint. From a moral standpoint there was no question, and in 2005, widespread concerns over human rights abuses voiced by UN member states led to the appointment of an independent expert on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (Sampson and Onuoha 2011).

The GWOT greatly damaged America's international reputation. Even though the Middle East has been the recipient of roughly one half of all US foreign aid, a July 2011 Zogby poll reveals that popular opinion toward America in the Middle East is considerably more negative than in

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persons accused of committing acts of terrorism (Crona and Richardson 1996). Following the attacks of 11 September, 2001, the Bush administration adopted this very approach (Kellner 2003).
[3] Executive Order No. 13,491, issued on January 27, 2009, addresses unlawful interrogation practices. Executive Order No. 13,492, also issued on January 27, 2009, addresses inhumane treatment of detainees at Guantanamo.
[4] See also the speech that Harold HongluKoh, legal advisor of U.S. Department of State, made at the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law (Koh 2010).

other developing areas receiving far less US assistance (Stockman 2011). Given America's unpopularity, Beg (2010) argues that the key to defeating terrorism lays neither with superior military strategy nor usable intelligence data. Rather, success will be obtained by preventing the recruitment of future *jihadists*. Pointing to suicide training centers for children in South Waziristan and factories for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide jackets in Southern Punjab, Beg insists that the only way to diminish recruitment is to directly challenge radical religious ideology.

Silke (2005) points to U.S. military retaliation against Libya in 1986, extra-legal assassinations in South Africa and Israel, and countless cases of internment without a trial such as in Northern Ireland to bolster his case that military tactics often do more to radicalize local populations than they achieve in countering terrorism.

One need only consider how the attacks on 9/11; 11 March, 2004 and 7 July, 2005 affected the West. As an example, Murphy et. al. (2004) point out that 9/11 constituted a cultural upheaval for most Americans. This cultural upheaval led to a change in values, which in turn led to a change in attitudes and finally a change in behavior. Among other noticeable changes in behavior (reduced travel, increased attendance at religious services, and increased patriotism), Americans as a whole also demanded retaliation. If the 9/11 attacks radicalized a population as large and heterogeneous as the United States, it is reasonable to expect repeated military attacks against a much more conservative and homogenous population to produce a similar radicalizing effect.

The point to be made here is that military solutions alone are not working (Solomon 2015). Lessons from both Vietnam and Iraq suggest that the only way to militarily defeat non-state enemies is to clear an area and hold it, perhaps indefinitely (Cordesman 2006). But this approach cannot work against terrorism. It is not enough to simply vanquish terrorist groups from a particular region. Even if the United States were willing and able to dedicate troops to the numerous locations where terrorists cells were uprooted with the sole mission of preventing their return, any useful solution to terrorism has to also address the perception that terrorism provides a viable option or new terrorist groups will simply spring up in their place (Gunaratna and Iqbal 2012).

According to the 2004 Zogby International-Sadat Chair poll, popular support for clerics in politics is on the rise, but largely only as an alternative to corrupt, puppet-regimes propped up by the West (Gause 2005).

Daniel Byman (2010) suggests that the United States consider an alternative to military tactics. He points to America's failed attempts at isolating and weakening Hamas. The solution, according to Byman, is direct engagement.

Braniff and Moghadam (2011) agree with Byman (2010). They point to the fact that the popular uprisings in Yemen, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and Syria were largely non-violent. These protests not only demonstrate the power of the Arab Street, but also that non-violent approaches are a popular and viable alternative to the violence advocated by al Qaeda and other groups. Braniff

and Moghadam also argue that Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution has taught us that popular uprisings can succeed where top-down regime change has failed.[5]

However, Braniff and Moghadam also caution us regarding al Qaeda's post 9/11 success in continuing to inspire global *jihadist* resistance against American hegemony despite the GWOT and the subsequent loss of Osama bin Laden and other key leaders. They remind us that al Qaeda has adapted and evolved and will continue to pose a threat to the West. Braniff and Moghadam's advice is justified by the fact that Islamism appears to be growing more popular in many Arab Spring states.

Public opinion among US Muslims also seems to align with this assessment. A 2007 Pew poll of US Muslims reveals that less than half of all respondents supported the GWOT, but even fewer (less than ten percent) supported violence such as suicide bombings in the name of Islam (McCauley and Scheckter 2011).

Likewise, Pargeter(2008) examines the rise of radical Islamism in Europe and notes that groups such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and many others only moved to Europe after they were forced out of their own countries. Therefore, Pargeter concludes that while there may be increasing support for *jihadist* strategies among Muslims in Europe, this support in no way constitutes a coherent, unified movement against the West. It is rather the result of a number of individual nationalist militant groups, with their own unique set of grievances against their home state, continuing to press their demands from exile.

Pargeter's findings, together with the data collected by the 2004 Zogby poll and the 2007 Pew poll, suggest that a moderate solution would be favored by the popular majority in both the Muslim world and the West.

Concerning the effectiveness of military approaches, Jones and Libicki(2008) examined 648 terrorist organizations to determine the most common ways that such groups end. They found that 43 percent of the 648 terrorist groups examined ended by joining the political process, 10 percent ended because they achieved their strategic goal(s), and only 7 percent ended because of military force exerted against them.

Furthermore, Jones and Libicki found that religious terrorist groups share a different experience. While 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended since 1968, only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended. As Neumann and Smith speculate (2005), religious groups rarely achieve their strategic goal(s), and no religious terrorist group that has ended since 1968 achieved its stated goals.

The Jasmine Revolution began when a young, unemployed Tunisian man protested the dire economic conditions [5] in the country by setting himself on fire in front of a government building on December 17, 2010. Others quickly joined in protest, and within a month, President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was forced to step down after 23 years of dictatorship.El-Khawas (2012) states that the Jasmine Revolution, which sparked the Arab Spring, was truly a popular revolution, with no leader and no political, ideological or religious aims.

If the recent Arab Spring has taught us anything, it is the lesson that public perception is relevant to policy considerations and that it can be a powerful force for change. As Byman (2010) argues, by adopting a policy of direct engagement, the United States can help to shape both the trajectory and outcome of that change.

Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) examine the situation in Israel. They suggest that rather than attempting to deter terrorists by raising the cost of engaging in terrorism through traditional counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures, policymakers should increase the benefits of not engaging in terrorism. They point out that in both the First and Second Intifada, conciliatory measures led to an overall decrease in terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the authors contend that repressive measures have never led to decreased attacks in Israel. Quite the contrary, they often lead to an increase in terrorist activity. Hamas and Hezbollah secured the loyalty of many in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon respectively by providing humanitarian services (Malka 2007; Flanigan and Abdel-Samad 2009). In the same respect, Dugan and Chenowith reason that Israel can diminish support for Hamas and Hezbollah by offering services that improve the status quo for Palestinians and Lebanese citizens.

Brym and Araj(2006) make a similar argument, asserting that acts of suicide terrorism against Israel are largely acts of retaliation against real or perceived injustice. This finding is supported globally as well by Piazza and Walsh (2009) who conclude that repressive regimes committing human rights violations experience higher incidents of terrorism than regimes that do not.

The solution is not to pursue a policy of reactive counterterrorism efforts detached from an overall strategy. Rather, a successful solution must take the enemy's strategic goals into consideration and apply the resources at our disposal in such a way as to prevent the enemy from achieving those goals. In short, there is no one universally accepted counterterrorism policy or approach. Each situation must be analyzed and responded to individually (Wilkinson 2014).

Other Approaches to Counterterrorism

The previous section largely discussed American approaches to counterterrorism which tend to be employed mostly against foreign targets (although there is a domestic aspect to it as well). The opposite is true in Europe, where most counterterrorism policies were originally targeted at domestic terrorism. The Europeans treated terrorism as a criminal offence (Anderson et al, 1995) while also attempting to uncover its root causes (Bjørgo 2004).[6]

However, rising security concerns over migration began pushing issues of transnational terrorism to the front burner (Joffé 2008). The pot boiled over in 2005, when the London attacks demonstrated that Islamic extremism was no longer just an external threat. It was now also a domestic issue. This realization caused a shift in counterterrorism policy from a focus on root causes to an emphasis on deradicalization (Coolsaet 2010). Of course, others such as Veldhuis and Staun (2009) argue that radicalization *is* a root cause of terrorism.

For clarification (in light of the recent referendum), for the purposes of this thesis, the United Kingdom is [6] included in discussions of Europe.

A natural outcome of this approach includes managing extremism. Prince (2016) defines extremism as not just possessing hostile beliefs towards members of specific groups (and intolerance for all who do not share those beliefs), but also a willingness to act upon those beliefs. Here too, perception of the other plays a vital role in understanding the motivation behind acts of violence.

Blakemore (2016) suggests that while lone-wolf attacks are a reality to contend with, organized extremist groups constitute the lion's share of threat to society. Indeed, Prince's definition of extremism paints an accurate likeness of groups such as al Shabaab and Boko Haram. The *takfiri* doctrine encourages hostility toward certain groups (Shia, Yazidis, Sufis, etc.) and intolerance of anyone who does not agree.

Awan (2016) rightfully cautions, however, that there are many types of extremists from all different cultures, classes and religions (Islamic, far left, far right and digital populist). Fixating on Islamic extremism alone does everyone an injustice, not just Muslims (Heck 2007).

Following the London and Madrid attacks, a number of European scholars also began to argue that counterterrorism efforts must incorporate a wide range of strategies that first take the individual aims and ambitions of each group into consideration (Neumann 2006; Pargeter 2006; Vidino 2006; Rosenthal 2007, Wuchte and Knani 2013).

Such an approach necessarily involves community-level involvement. For instance, Tucker (2016) suggests a community-led "neighborhood policing" approach whenever possible as it is more sensitive to the local population than the more common "community policing" approach (p. 35). The basic difference between the two is geographic. Neighborhood policing recognizes that there can be a number of diverse neighborhoods within any community, and it seeks to train and appoint officers that are familiar with and sensitive to the specific needs of each neighborhood who will also be more aware of suspicious activity. The intended result is more effective policing with sensitivity to sub-groups within a community and fewer incidents of police brutality.

One of the downsides to such an approach is that actual geographic borders rarely coincide with virtual borders, making neighborhood policing less efficient and more reliant on more formal international agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Den Boer et al. (2008) caution, however, that the more horizontal arrangements such as local neighborhood policing may in fact undermine the efficacy of established vertical international agencies.

Whether through local arrangements or through international organizations, there seems to be broad agreement that managing extremism is an integral component of effective counterterrorism (Awan 2016, Blakemore 2016, Prince 2016).

The European approach to counterterrorism has been much more comprehensive in scope than the American approach. Other considerations include the strength and limitations of national legislation on issues such as hate crimes (Bleich 2011), how to deal with digital communities (Ball and Webster 2003), and the age-old challenge of balancing civil liberty with national security (De Hert 2005). Another consideration is how to avoid backlash.

Backlash Effects

The most fundamental assumption in economics is the belief that individuals are rational. As such, they are utility maximizers who make decisions according to cost-benefit calculations. In other words, economists view individuals as rational actors who will alwaysattempt to maximize their personal gain while at the same time minimizing expenses.

The field of criminal law adopts this assumption. Hence, harsher punishments and greater chances of apprehension *should* increase deterrence. This is not always the case, however, particularly if the government is viewed as illegitimate and/or its response to criminal activity is considered disproportionate by the community (LaFree et. al., 2009).

In such cases, backlash can occur—a target government's harsh countermeasures generate new grievances, thus provoking an increase in terrorist violence and fostering additional public support for the perpetrators (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Bloom, 2005, pp. 118-19; Gupta and Mundra, 2005; Kaplan et al., 2005; Bueno de Mesquita and Dixon, 2007; Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007; Tessler and Robbins, 2007; Byman and Pollack, 2008; Arce and Sandler, 2010; Jaeger et al., 2012; Argomaniz& Vidal-Diez, 2015).

For example, Jaeger et al (2008) measure political preferences among Palestinians and find that those who were in their teenage years during the First Intifada possess more radical views than those who were teenagers at the height of the Oslo negotiations. Similarly, Kaplan et al. (2005) insist that Israel's targeted assassination of terror suspects escalated both terror recruitment and the overall rate of suicide bombings in the area.

Heymann (2003) concludes that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) enjoyed dramatic increases in recruitment as a result of harsh British retaliation against the group. Likewise, Reinares and Jaime-Jime´nez (2000) suggest that Spanish state-sponsored terrorism is a primary reason that Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) continued after Spain's transition to democracy. Gil-Alana and Barros (2010) compare two diverse policies employed by the Spanish government in response to terrorist violence perpetrated by ETA. The first was more conciliatory—embracing democratic values, treaties, ceasefires and Basque autonomy. The second centered on arrests, targeted assassinations, banning the HerriBatasuna from politics and censoring news media supportive of the group. Gil-Alana and Barros note an increase in violence in response to the harsher countermeasures. Kydd and Walter (2006) agree that harsh government overreactions to terrorist activity provide a vital lifeline for the survival of organizations that engage in terrorist violence.

Far from advocating a dovish response to terrorist activity, this article argues that a middle ground is preferable. Often, accommodation on the part of the target government leads to a deal with the moderates within an organization. The result is a higher concentration of hardliners and an escalation in violence (Sandler, 2003; Stohl, 2006). This happened in Somalia following the 2006 invasion of Ethiopian forces. Many moderate members of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) fled to Eritrea where they formed the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia and eventually concluded a peace agreement with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Meanwhile, the majority of the hard-liners from the ICU joined al-Shabaab (Maszka, 2017).

Thus, while the body of literature casts doubt on the overall effectiveness of attempts to deter terrorist violence through harsh countermeasures, the empirical record demonstrates that

pacification/cooperation also has its limits. Although accommodation may appease the moderates within an organization, it could also very well fractionalize the group and further alienate the hardliners who then become the dominant voice (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008).

Both a policy of harsh retaliation and a policy of conciliation have the potential to escalate terrorist violence. The strategic approach affords us a third way by avoiding either extreme.

The Strategic Approach

What does it mean to act strategically in our efforts to prevent terrorist violence? To begin with, one has to distinguish between means and ends. What is the opponent's goal, and what means are they employing to achieve that goal? For example, Hoffman (2009) insists that a crucial step in reducing terrorist violence is to break the cycle of terrorist recruitment. The long-term goal in this case is to reduce terrorist violence. The strategy is to break the cycle of recruitment. Therefore, the tactical use of the means at one's disposal should be employed to logically produce this effect. In order to break the cycle of recruitment, the status quo has to be more appealing to potential recruits than a violent alternative (Clarke 2009). However, in too many instances, the tactical use of violence has not been used in service to a desired strategic goal at all.

In all fairness, the balance between maintaining order and security on the one hand, and acting strategically on the other, is difficult to achieve. Terror attacks are intended to provoke an overreaction on the part of the target state. Who is not both shocked and angry when they see reports of attacks against a children's park on a major religious holiday? The impetus to react is very strong. However, to simply react without the guidance of strategy is a mistake.

This is not to suggest that society simply accepts acts of terrorism or that governments never employ military force against those who engage in terrorist violence. Only that an understanding of each actor's strategic horizon is critical (Wuchte and Knani 2013). Which means that any effective counterterrorism or antiterrorism policy requires more than a short-sighted fixation on the tactic of violence itself (Bryden 2006).

In northeastern Nigeria, for example, more than 650,000 people remain internally displaced and thousands more have been brutally murdered (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2015). Boko Haram is only partially to blame for these victims, however. Nigerian security forces and the state-led Joint Military Task Force (JTF) are equally culpable due to their policy of indiscriminately targeting civilians and entire villages suspected of harboring Boko Haram members and supporters (Jarvis 2009). In fact, Solomon (2015, p. 225) states that "state violence in the form of counter-terrorism has been indistinguishable from Boko Haram terrorism."

One of Boko Haram's key strategic goals is to rid Nigeria of its corrupt government officials. However, rather than attempting to counter Boko Haram's anti-government message, Nigerian security forces and the JTF are instead confirming it by overreacting to the group's tactical use of violence and responding with brute military force. Atrocities such as these only serve to exacerbate the violence. They also increase popular support for Boko Haram by demonstrating to the average Nigerian (and to the world) just how corrupt and inhumane the Nigerian government can be (Baiyewu 2014).

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 is another classic example. Both Somali and Ethiopian military forces systematically attacked the homes of al Shabaab members and supporters, killing their families and destroying their property. Rather than addressing one of the key strategic goals of the group (the elimination of foreign military intervention in Somalia), this particular counterterrorism measure was focused solely on al Shabaab's tactical use of violence and ultimately served to increase the level of terrorist violence in Somalia by reinforcing the public perception that Somalia needed to be defended against the military incursion of Ethiopia. The sympathy this tactic generated on behalf of al Shabaab members and their families translated into massive support for the movement in the form of sympathy, funds, food, clothing and recruits. It also reinforced the perception among many Somalis that the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was illegitimate and needed to be overthrown (Marchal 2009).

When the United States (U.S.), Kenya, Uganda and others joined the fight against al Shabaab, they only served to escalate the violence. It was not long before the group began to retaliate against some of the very governments that supported counter-terrorism efforts against it. In 2010, al Shabaab carried out twin suicide attacks in Uganda, killing 78 people in Kampala and injuring 89 others while they watched the World Cup. This was the deadliest military assault in sub-Saharan Africa since 1998, when al-Qaida bombed the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (Holzer 2010). Al Shabaab later retaliated against Kenya in the famed Westgate Shopping Mall attack in September 2013 and again with the slaughter of 147 university students in Garissa on April 2, 2015.

Boko Haram also engaged in a series of cross-border attacks against Chad in early 2015 in retaliation for its participation in a multinational counterterrorism effort against the group (International Crisis Group 2014; Blanchard 2015). Clearly, an understanding of these two groups' strategic goals would have gone a long way in creating a more effective counterstrategy.

There are far too many other examples of ineffective counterterrorism measures gone awry to mention here. As for antiterrorism measures, simply hardening an asset in no way deters an act of terrorism because it does not address the underlying motivation behind the decision to resort to violence in the first place. Not to mention, another target can always be chosen as a suitable replacement.

The point that these examples are intended to make is simply that strategic theory offers policy makers and terrorism scholars a more comprehensive understanding of an actor's decision to employ tactical violence in the first place. And though this is not the primary task of the strategic theorist (Smith 1991), it is the primary task of most policy makers and terrorism scholars.

CONCLUSION
This article addressed why counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures do not work. Despite efforts to combat terrorism, incidents of terrorist violence have grown more numerous and more deadly over the past three decades. Contrary to the once commonly-held assumption that harsher countermeasures served as a deterrent, a vast body of literature supports just the opposite conclusion—rather than deterrence, harsh countermeasures result in backlash and increased support for the actors engaged in terrorist violence. Far from advocating a dovish response to

terrorist activity, the article argues that thestrategic approach is the smarter and more effective way forward.

Acting strategically means to distinguish between means and ends—possessing both an understanding of the opponent's strategic objectiveas well as a knowledge of the means employed to achieve that goal. Unfortunately, most policy makers pursue either measures aimed at deterrence or concessions aimed at conciliation—neither of which have a proven record of success.

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